A Dragon in Antarctica – Part Two

It has been 40 years since China inaugurated its first Antarctic research station, Chángchéng (Great Wall) on King George Island. This anniversary presents an opportunity to look back at the origins and ambitions of the Chinese Antarctic Programme (CHINARE).

This is a two-part article by guest author and polar history expert Jean de Pomereu. We present part 2 today. Part One was published on March 7th, 2025.

Summary of Part One: During the 1980s, China’s Antarctic research activities were modest compared to those of the original Antarctic Treaty signatories. Despite this, China aimed to expand its capacity by constructing new stations and acquiring necessary infrastructure. This led to the establishment of the Zhongshan station in 1989 and the acquisition of the Xue Long icebreaker in 1993. The establishment of Zhongshan station facilitated various scientific research activities and served as a logistical hub. China’s first inland expeditions started in the mid-1990s, leading to significant scientific achievements, such as reaching Dome A in 2005. Continued efforts culminated in the creation of the Kunlun station in 2009, further solidifying China’s Antarctic presence.

Following the IPY, China continued apace with its capacity building in Antarctica, its involvement in Antarctic governance, and the rapid expansion of its scientific programmes across all fields of polar research. This comprised boosting science funding and training for a new generation of Chinese polar scientists; the renovation and expansion of existing infrastructures; and the building of new ones at a time when the resources of many European Antarctic and other programmes were stagnant or in decline. The result was a doubling of Chinese scientific publications relating to the Antarctic between 2010 and 2017, and a continued increase since then.

In 2014, China established a second inland summer station, Taishan Camp, located about halfway along the traverse between Zhongshan and Kunlun stations. The purpose of this station was both logistical and scientific, with a focus on glaciology, meteorology, and space physics. The following year, 2015, CHINARE put into service its Snow Eagle 601 Basler aircraft (reengineered around a World War II airframe) and launched an array of three polar observation satellites as part of its CubeSat mission.

Snow Eagle 601 was designed for logistics and the transport of personnel between stations, as well as for aerial radio echo survey of the ice sheet south of Zhongshan station. The aircraft has been used for surveying campaigns every year since 2015, and the retrieved data has been shared with the international scientific community through the Bedmap 3 programme to map Antarctica’s bedrock topography and fluctuating ice thickness.

China’s most significant capacity building project since the inauguration of Chángchéng station, however, was the domestic construction of a second icebreaker, the 122 meters Xue Long 2, which came into service in 2019. Like the original Xue Long, which remains in operation, Xue Long 2 is a multipurpose vessel that is used for both logistical support and science. Operated by the Polar Research Institute of China, both vessels are regularly used to deploy buoys and Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (UAVs) for oceanographic research in conjunction with international programmes such as the Southern Ocean Observing System (SOOS).

Five years after Xue Long 2, in 2024, China also launched two smaller ice breakers: the Ji Di (Polar), operated by the State Oceanic Administration, and the Tan Suo San Hao, operated by the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Although conceived more specifically for research in the Arctic – both vessels are capable of operating in the Antarctic, thus providing China with one of the largest icebreaker fleets for Antarctic research and operations.

Moreover, in 2024, China inaugurated its fifth Antarctic station, Qinling, on Inexpressible Island, in the Ross Sea region. Large enough to accommodate 80 people in summer and 30 in winter, and eventually to operate on 60% renewable energy, Qinling is now China’s largest and most advanced Antarctic station. Its stated objective is to enhance CHINARE’s scientific and observational capacity, as well as to keep up with the rapid increase in Chinese Antarctic research funding and scientific projects that depend on access to the continent. One of these is the upcoming Illuminating Ice Sheet program which intends to study the stability of the East Antarctic ice sheet and its potential contribution to sea level rise by carrying out scientific traverses from Zhongshan station to Qinling, via Dome A.

Since the start of its construction, Qinling has drawn much attention from the international media, as well as scrutiny from other members of the ATS. This is largely due to its strategic location within New Zealand’s territorial claim, and its expansion of China’s sphere of influence and research capacity right around the continent – and potentially beyond. Although dependent on fewer personnel than the Antarctic programmes of the United States, Russia, Australia, Chile and Argentina, China’s three year-round coastal stations – Qinling, Zhongshan, and Chángchéng – place the country in a strategically favourable position should the Antarctic Treaty succumb to international geopolitical tensions. Or indeed if it loses its exceptional status as a continent for peace and science.

China’s research capacity and strategic positioning in Antarctica are indeed about to be further strengthened by the country’s recent submission of a draft environmental evaluation to the ATS, outlining plans to establish a sixth Antarctic station on the extremely remote coast of Marie Byrd Land in West Antarctica. Designed to accommodate up to 25 researchers during the summer months, the station is set to open in 2027 – 42 years after Chángchéng. As Chinese ambassador to Australia, Xiao Qian, explained in an interview with ABC News, the facility will be solely dedicated to glaciological and climate science in a region that remains sparsely studied despite being among the most vulnerable to oceanic warming and ice melt. This vulnerability is best exemplified by Marie Byrd Land’s rapidly retreating and much publicized Thwaites and Pine Island glaciers.

Influence and Strategy

Like many other Antarctic Treaty nations and programmes throughout Antarctica’s short history, China has steadily increased its logistical and scientific footprint in Antarctica since becoming a consultative member of the Antarctic Treaty in 1985. This ongoing commitment and the pace at which it is being bolstered reflects its determination to catch-up with the historic precedence of the largest Antarctic programmes – particularly those of the United States and Russia. Depending on the perspective, this has been viewed as a natural progression driven by scientific development, or as part of a broader geopolitical strategy.

As we have seen, the ambition to contribute scientifically to our shared understanding of Antarctic environments and of their global significance is a continuation of the spirit scientific cooperation that was born of the IGY 1957-58, at the heart of the Cold War, when scientists on both sides of the Iron Curtain found ways to collaborate and exchange information. This perspective is indeed the one that, still today, most closely aligns with the spirit of the Antarctic Treaty and its goals to perpetuate international openness and goodwill. From a geopolitical perspective, on the other hand, there is an inevitable and legitimate desire among both global powers and smaller nations to expand their zones of influence across Antarctica, to contribute to the continent’s international governance while it endures – or to acquire a position of diplomatic strength should it falter.

The reality, of course, is that scientific development and geopolitical strategy are intimately intertwined in Antarctica, and that maintaining a balance between the two is essential – not only for the continent’s environmental conservation, but also for its peaceful governance. Ultimately, this all comes down to trust, respect, and ensuring that global tensions do not spill over into the Antarctic sphere – or vice versa.

As history show us, Antarctica is a region where tensions have traditionally been resolved peacefully and judiciously. Current frictions include the continued rejection by the ATS of China’s proposal to create an Antarctic Special Managed Area (ASMA) at Dome A – this despite its similarities to the ASMA that the United States had approved in the vicinity of its South Pole station. And secondly, China’s repeated and perhaps reciprocal reluctance to support the creation of new Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) in the Southern Ocean.

Such choke-points in the continued international governance of Antarctica take us back to Deng Xiaping’s statement that China, and indeed all nations, should “contribute to mankind’s peaceful use of Antarctica”. Which is to say, by extension, to the definition of the word ‘use’.

In a context of renewed and heightened global disruptions – including in Antarctica’s polar-opposite, the Arctic – the word ‘use’ could take two divergent meanings. On the one hand, it might signify the expansion of resource exploitation on the continent and in its surrounding ocean. On the other, in alignment with the forthcoming International Polar Year 2032-33, it could be restricted to the compilation of data and understanding for the better conservation of local and global environments within the broader context of global warming and ecosystem degradation.

Regardless of national or individual perspectives, four decades after that first Chinese flag planting ceremony to inaugurate Chángchéng station, this question – central to Antarctica’s future – can now only be answered in dialogue with China.

Notes by the author:
I would like to acknowledge Professor Alan Hemmings for his constructive feedback and suggestions, which played an important role in refining certain aspects of this article. Responsibility for all positions, assertions and any errors reside with the author.
This article was supported by the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions (MSCA) under the ICEglobe project funded by the European Union’s Horizon 2014-2020 research and innovation programme.

Jean de Pomereu is a research associate at the Scott Polar Reseach Institute, University of Cambridge. His research focuses on the scientific history of the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets and on the visual and material culture of Antarctica. During the 4th International Polar Year 2007-08, he was the first foreign reporter to accompany a Chinese Antarctic research expedition.